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Deconstructing the Wall:
The Analysis and Implications of the 2004 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on
the Use of Border Walls

Introduction to the Israeli Barrier
In 2002, the Israeli government began construction on a barrier in and around the
Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank and Jerusalem. The West Bank is located to the
west of the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. The western ‘border’ of the West Bank is typically
referred to as part of the Green Line, a de facto border that the Arab Nations and Israel
negotiated in the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Officially known as “Armistice Demarcation
Lines,” the track known as the Green Line “[delineated] the lines beyond which the armed forces
of [Israel and Jordan] shall not move”, as outlined in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the agreements
(Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement). In 1967, Israel captured the West Bank
territory, as well as other Palestinian territories, and it became the Occupied Palestinian Territory
of the West Bank (Metz 29). This territory was seized from the jurisdiction of Jordan and is not
recognized as part of the country of Israel, therefore, the Green Line is still referenced in modern
discussion of Palestine and Israel. This Green Line is regarded as the spot where Israel stops and
the territory of Palestine begins. Although this line is the de facto border, Israeli armed forces are
allowed to operate beyond it due to the status of the West Bank as an Occupied Territory.
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Israel proposed the barrier as a way for the government to limit Palestinians from moving
into and out of the West Bank. Israel’s government claimed that the barrier is intended to limit
Palestinian terrorist attacks by regulating movement with the 39 gates in the barrier that
Palestinians are permitted to use (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). Since 2002,
there have been several petitions against the route of the barrier, with the Israeli High Court of
Justice (IHCJ) declaring its illegality in specific portions of the route each time someone brought
suit against the wall. After the most recent amendment to the route of the barrier in 2007, 85
percent of the modified path lies to the east of the Green Line (B’Tselem, “The Separation
Barrier”). As of 2012, approximately 60 percent of the barrier’s construction in and around the
West Bank, including through the city of Jerusalem, has been completed, with a tenth of the
route currently under construction. The remaining 30 percent is part of the proposed route of
construction. As of 2011, roughly 670,000 dunams – about 170,000 acres – of the West Bank
territory is west of the barrier (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). There are two
main reasons why the construction of the barrier is controversial. The first is that there is concern
over the effects of the barrier on the rights of the Palestinian populace, such as the right to selfdetermination or the right to freedom of movement. The second is that the current route of the
barrier extends beyond the Green Line.
As a result of these concerns being expressed by the international community, the United
Nations General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the wall
in Palestine. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial organ of the United Nations,
published an Advisory Opinion in 2004. The Opinion contained several conclusions: 1) by
fourteen votes to one, the construction of the wall in the West Bank and Jerusalem is illegal
according to international law, 2) by fourteen votes to one, Israel is obligated to stop construction
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and deconstruct the barrier, 3) by fourteen votes to one, Israel is obligated to make reparations,
4) by thirteen votes to two, all other states are obligated not to recognize the legitimacy of the
barrier and not to supply aid to continue the construction of the barrier, and 5) by fourteen votes
to one, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council ought to debate how to best
end the situation that is contrary to international law (201-202).

Goals, Methodology, and Significance
The goal of this essay is to find out what implications the 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion’s
conditions for the illegality of the Israeli barrier has on the use of walls/barrier in and around
territories under foreign occupation, including partially recognized states that the occupying
power considers part of its territory. Since the Advisory Opinion discusses, both implicitly and
explicitly, the conditionality that makes the barrier illegal, these conditions – if legitimate – can
be applied to other spaces where there are barriers in order to ascertain the legality of these other
circumstances. In general, Israel and its advocates reject both the jurisdiction and the legitimacy
of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the matter of the wall. The general consensus in the
international community is that this ruling is legitimate, evident by the UN General Assembly’s
resolution in 2004 to comply with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. 150 countries voted in favor, with
the only states to vote against the resolution being Australia, the Federated States of Micronesia,
Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the United States (United Nations, “UN Assembly votes
overwhelmingly to demand Israel comply with the ICJ ruling”). Because the United States is a
permanent member on the Security Council of the UN, this resolution did not come to fruition, as
actions of the UN General Assembly must be approved by all five permanent members of the
Security Council.
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In the course of this paper, I will briefly analyze the jurisprudence – or legal philosophy –
of the International Court of Justice, as well as the critiques of the Advisory Opinion. I will also
summarize Israel’s defense arguments and determine whether or not they have been rightfully
dismissed by the ICJ. Additionally, I will study the various human rights law treaties that these
texts reference in their judgment of the barrier in order to sufficiently understand the context in
which these judgments were made. Then, I will apply the Advisory Opinion to another so-called
border wall, specifically the construction of a barrier made of sand by the Moroccan government
against the partially recognized state of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or Western
Sahara.
Answering these questions will help to provide insight into two main areas in modern
international relations. The first is that it may be possible to accurately predict the legality of the
border constructions in Western Sahara, as well as being able to develop a sort of legality
checklist that can be applied to any barrier construction. This will allow the territories that feel a
barrier violates their rights to determine if their case can be brought to the ICJ with a chance of a
result in their favor. Secondly, by determining if the two barriers are illegal or not, it is possible
to look at the efficacy of the ICJ and UN as a whole. If the barriers are legal, then no changes
need to be made and the ICJ must be analyzed as to why it ruled that the Israeli barrier is illegal.
If the barriers are illegal and no changes have come from the ICJ or UN’s actions, then this calls
their effectiveness and international political clout into question. In either case, this research
provides an opportunity for reflection into the international governmental bodies that represent a
large number of state governments.
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Analysis of the Israeli Argument
The main proposition for Israel is contained in three primary arguments that will be
referred to here as the ‘self-defense argument,’ the ‘necessity argument,’ and the ‘proportionality
argument,’ but each one of these propositions has its critique. The self-defense argument asserts
that the right to self-defense overrides any and all human rights violations that may arise because
of the barrier’s construction. Secondly, the necessity argument puts forth the idea that the barrier
was only constructed out of need. Thirdly, the proportionality argument claims that the human
rights violations that result from the barrier and the possible human rights violations of terrorism
are equal, and therefore the barrier is justified in its construction. In the following sections, I will
analyze and review the three pro-barrier arguments and determine their legitimacy.

Analyzing the Claim to Self-Defense
The first argument in favor of the barrier is grounded in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, which reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security” (10-11). Israel uses the beginning of this clause to emphasize
their argument that even if the wall violates international law, it acts as self-defense and is
therefore valid, as “nothing…shall impair” the right to self-defense.
To support this idea, Arye Schreiber argues that subsequent to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the world “widely and rightly understood” that the right of self-defense
applied “whether or not the attack came from a state” (160). However, his main arguments are
based in actions that were “in the wake of 9/11” (Schreiber 160). Ignoring the prominent
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academic and global assertion that after 9/11, governments “have adopted a plethora of invasive
counterterrorism measures that expand the powers of security agencies and inflict severe legal,
political, and economic costs” (Hegemann and Kahl 199). Schreiber fails to outline who “widely
and rightly” understood 9/11 to constitute a broad interpretation of Article 51’s application, or to
justify such an interpretation. In their Opinion, the ICJ argued that the right to self-defense
applies “in the case of armed attacks by one State against another State” (194). This would mean
that actions taken against terrorist organizations or non-state actors would be limited by other
parts of the UN Charter and human rights law treaties. While this argument may seem to be too
strict of an interpretation of Article 51, it could have arisen from a concern about the actions
taken in the Middle East by Western countries in the years following the attacks on September
11th that were justified using the argument of self-defense or national security. This idea of using
national security as a legitimizing argument for human rights abuses is explained by Rebecca
Sanders:

In crises, law is ignored or suspended in the name of emergency. Sovereign power
asserts itself as the real source of order, eroding the neutral, independent rule of
law and harkening the growth of dictatorship. Other scholars have noted
similarities between current practice and past human rights violations conducted
in the name of national security. During the Cold War, policy makers favoured
the doctrine of ‘plausible deniability’. Rather than openly derogate from
constraining rules, human rights abuses at home or abroad, unsavoury alliances,
and illegal activities were pursued covertly with the intent of evading discovery,
responsibility and justification. (Sanders 605 – 606)
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This analysis of plausible deniability outlines how governments use fear and crises, which are
most often terrorist attacks in the modern era, as opportunities to introduce new policies that
inflict the kinds of costs that Hegemann and Kahl mention.
According to the ICJ, since Palestine is not recognized by Israel or the Security Council
of the United Nations as a state, the self-defense argument does not apply in the case of the
barrier. In order for the self-defense argument to be seen as valid by the Court, Israel would have
to either recognize Palestine as a state, therefore giving it all the sovereignty that comes with
such status, or destroy the current barrier and reconstruct it in such a way that the rights of the
Palestinians are not violated.
Additionally, I would argue that the claim that self-defense overrides any human rights
violations cannot be made as a result of the initial rhetoric. When the UN Charter reads that
“nothing in the present Charter” will prevent the right to self-defense, they have caught states in
a technicality. By asserting that the current charter guarantees the self-defense override, they
allow other documents, such as international human rights law treaties and conventions, to
technically be above the right to a state’s right to self-defense. Therefore, the assertion by the ICJ
that the right to self-defense does not apply in the case of armed attack by a non-state actor is
supplementary to the language in the Charter that outlines the states’ right to self-defense in the
first place.

Examining the Assertion of Necessity
The second argument is one that argues that the only way to defend Israel from terrorism
was through the barrier’s construction. If proven valid, this argument would disqualify the
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barrier’s violations of international law. Yet for this case to be acceptable, the Israeli
government would have had no other option to prevent terrorist attacks than to build this barrier.
No other policies or tactics, whether they be more or less feasible, would have to exist. The ICJ
mentioned that according to global treaties, the state claiming necessity is not the sole judge of
this conditionality (195). Next, the Court stated that they are “not convinced that the construction
of the wall along the route chosen” is the only way to protect Israel from terrorist attacks (195).
This is important to note, because all of the reasons why the barrier violates international law are
founded on the fact that it extends beyond the Green Line, effectively acquiring territory for
Israel and creating enclaves, therefore significantly impeding on the Palestinians’ right to
freedom of movement and right to self-determination. Self-determination is outlined in Article 3
and 4 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as the
ability of a people to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development,” as well as the right to “autonomy or self-government in
matters relation to their internal and local affairs” (4-5). By passing through the Palestinian
territory and restricting movement within the territory, the barrier restricts these abilities, as well
as diminishing or eliminating any notion of Palestinian autonomy.
The Israeli High Court of Justice (ICHJ) has taken a similar approach, issuing very
specific rulings that focus on the route of the wall, which has been revised again and again
(B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier”). The IHCJ’s main concern seems to be that the route of the
wall has created enclaves and limited the Palestinians’ access to things like hospitals and
schools. This would be comparable to the ICJ’s jurisprudence, though the ICJ was concerned
with the wall as a whole, rather than focusing on particular sections of the wall. This focus on the
route of the barrier makes up almost the entire controversy. It seems that if the barrier had been
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constructed either along the Green Line or solely on Israeli territory, then a much lower number
of human rights violations would have occurred and the conversation would solely be about
Palestinians traveling back and forth between the West Bank and territory held by Israel.

Evaluating the Notion of Proportionality
The third argument is that when weighed against each other, the human rights abuses
perpetrated by the Israeli barrier and the threat of terrorism are proportional. In order for this
argument to hold true, then there must be minimal violations of human rights. This would be true
either because human rights law treaties do not apply to Palestine or for the barrier to not violate
a significant number of rights. To advocate for this methodology, Israel has asserted that the
International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR) does not apply to Palestine in the
case of the wall because “humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation,”
while human rights are “intended for the protection of citizens from their own Government in
times of peace” (qtd. in International Court of Justice, 177). This is to say that because Palestine
is under foreign occupation and because there are numerous clashes between Israelis and
Palestinians – be it settlers, civilians, or militants – Palestine is in a “conflict situation.” Under
the Israeli assertion human rights law treaties such as the ICPCR would not apply, while under
peaceful circumstances, human rights law would apply.
This justification could work, considering that the stated reason for the construction of
the wall is to defend Israel from Palestinian terrorism. However, there is one strange aspect of
this argument’s rhetoric. It makes very little sense for the words “from their own Government” to
be in this line of reasoning. Palestine is under foreign occupation by the Israeli government, and
according to international law, Israel is at the very least partially responsible for the protection of
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human rights in the Occupied Territories of Palestine as outlined in Article 73 of the UN Charter
(14). Nevertheless, the Court rejected this argument, saying that the human rights outlined in the
Covenant referenced do “not cease in times of war” (177). Therefore, the rights outlined in the
ICPCR do apply in the case of the barrier. Moreover, the Court asserts that the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
apply to Palestine in all situations, not just in the debate over the barrier (192). Consequently, not
only do the rights outlined in the ICPCR apply to Palestine, but they must also apply to all
territories, regardless of the presence or absence of conflict.
By arguing that human rights law cannot apply to Palestine, given Israel’s rejection of the
ICPCR in regards to the current issue, Israel is basing their argument in this case on the concept
that is known as ‘legal-space theory.’ Legal-space theory asserts that actions of one state inside
the borders of another “would not be governed by the Convention obligations of the first State, if
the second State is not also a party to the Convention” (Wilde, 670). To simplify this analysis,
legal-space theory allows one state to violate human rights law treaties in another state as long as
the latter has not signed the treaty. This is yet another inherent problem, as some agreements are
only signed by very specific states, usually the states that are considered the ‘global North.’ This
means that the powerful nations of the world would be able to abuse the human rights agreed
upon in these conventions, as long as these human rights abuses took place in countries that are
not also signatories – which are usually the countries with less clout and influence. Furthermore,
the phrasing of this model limits human rights law treaties and conventions to territories that are
internationally or overwhelmingly recognized as states. By enforcing these conventions
exclusively on those countries that were parties of these treaties, a “two-tier system of human
rights treaties” is created, meaning that citizens of some countries are afforded the protection of
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human rights law treaties while others are not (Wilde 671). If the ICJ had ruled that human rights
law treaties did not apply to Palestine, whether it be the lack of statehood, then human rights
violations could legally take place in myriad regions across the globe. Regions like the Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic (declared independence from Morocco), Kosovo (declared
independence from Serbia), Abkhazia (declared independence from Georgia), the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (declared independence from Cyprus), South Ossetia (declared
independence from Georgia), the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (declared independence from
Azerbaijan), the Transnistria (declared independence from Moldova), and Somaliland (declared
independence from Somalia) would not be protected from human rights violations by the
countries that they declared their independence from. Secondly, if the ICJ had limited the reach
of human rights law treaties by saying that they did not apply in times of war, then violations
could occur in any country that is involved in an armed conflict at the time of the violation.
Schreiber counters the ICJ’s jurisprudence with the assertion that the Court ought to have
weighed the rights and obligations that the wall contradicted against the violations of
international law or abuses of human rights that the law is meant to prevent and therefore did not
properly address the issue of proportionality (160). This argument makes sense in the discipline
of foreign policy; it is important to do cost/benefit analyses in decision-making. However, I
argue that in order to weigh these two against each other, one would have to compare the value
of human lives on either side of the wall. This would violate the very concept of human rights,
which are meant to show the equality of all individuals in the face of the law and of governance.
Furthermore, I would argue that if these two were to be weighed against each other, Israel would
not have won its right to the construction of the barrier. This is because in the 92 communities
that are directly affected by the wall, Palestinian access to water, education, and medical services
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is severely limited (B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier – Statistics”). And as Steve Niva points
out, the barrier has actually increased the number of suicide bombings and destroyed Palestinian
infrastructure, leaving the administrative arena vulnerable to extremist groups such as Hamas
(78). So the violations that the barrier was meant to prevent have actually been exacerbated,
though conveniently contained only within the Occupied Palestinian Territories, while the
violations that the barrier is causing are not alleviated.

Drawing Conclusions and Developing Conditions
To summarize, the barrier is contrary to international law for several reasons. Firstly, it
significantly impedes on the Palestinian right to self-determination. This right is outlined in the
United Nations Charter and was expanded to include non-self-governing territories. The wall
impedes on the right to self-determination by creating a “de facto annexation” of Palestinian
territory that interferes with territorial sovereignty, something that non-self-governing territories
do have (181). Secondly, the barrier limits access to healthcare, education. In its very essence,
the barrier prevents movement. This would not be an issue if only the movement into Israel was
limited, but Palestinians’ freedom of movement is restricted when traveling from areas of the
West Bank to other areas of the West Bank due to the course of the barrier and the enclaves it
creates. All of these violations of international law arise from the route of the barrier. If it had
stayed on or behind the Green Line, then none of these specific human rights abuses or
international law violations would have occurred.
Therefore, the conditions which make the Israeli barrier contradictory to international law
are: 1) the de facto annexation of territory, which is done by extending the barrier beyond the
territory of Israel, the constructing state, and 2) rights that are guaranteed by international
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covenant are restricted by the barrier, while 3) no other state entities threaten Israel, the
constructing state.

Employing Conditions
If we then take these conditions and apply them to other barriers across the globe, we can
determine if they contradict international law – or at the very least if a case could be made for
their illegality in the International Court of Justice. In this section of the essay, I will apply the
conditions outlined in the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion to the Moroccan built barrier in the
disputed territory of the Western Sahara. To do this, I will briefly summarize the postcolonization history of the region. After properly outlining the situation, I will then apply the
conditions outlined above. I have chosen this case study for two main reasons. The first is that
unlike the Israeli barrier, the Moroccan barrier is not in the front of the public consciousness.
Secondly, this is a case of a state building barriers as part of an occupation in another state’s
territory, though it is a disputed territory. The analysis and application will be based on whether
or not this barrier fits the conditions outlined above.

The Moroccan Berm
In order to properly apply the conditions outlined above, we must first understand the
history of the Moroccan barrier in Western Sahara. Western Sahara is a disputed territory that
lies directly to the south of the country of Morocco and was released from Spanish rule in 1975.
Previously, during the process of decolonization, the 1974 International Court of Justice ruling
asserted that the indigenous Sahrawi tribes in the region known as Western Sahara did have the
right to self-determination (de Orellana 482). This means that the region had the right to establish
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its own political entity after Spain left. However, Morocco and Mauritania, the state that is just
south of Western Sahara, moved in to claim the region. In defense, the Sahrawis founded the
Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or POLISARIO, as the military
and political organization of Western Sahara. Mauritania was pushed out by POLISARIO forces
and recognized the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was
founded in 1976 (Farah 77).
Though Mauritania recognized the SADR and pulled its troops out of Western Sahara,
Morocco continued to claim sovereignty over the region – despite there being no other country
that recognized this claim (Farah 77). In 1980, the Moroccan government began construction on
a barrier in the northwestern corner of Western Sahara, known as the “useful triangle” and
encircled roughly 15% of the territory (Damis 165). This was the first barrier that Morocco
constructed in Western Sahara. Morocco built up more barriers to the south and east, each one
farther into Western Sahara than the one that preceded it. By 1987, six barriers had been built
(“The end”; Damis 165). Roughly seven feet tall, the longest portion of the completed barrier
runs over 1,000 miles from the northeastern corner of the region to the southwestern coast in a
diagonal, snaking line. It is composed of compacted sand, barbed wire, and an unknown amount
of landmines (Damis 165). The Sahrawis have named this barrier “the wall of shame” and call
the territory that Morocco encircled the “occupied territories” (“Minister of Communication”;
Copete 12). Morocco, on the other hand, dubbed the wall “the Defensive Wall” (“Minister of
Communication”). For the purpose of this essay, we will refer to this barrier as ‘the Moroccan
Berm,’ with a berm being a wall constructed out of compacted sand.
The construction of walls that moved farther south each time constitutes the “territorial
acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force” that is contrary to international law
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(International Court of Justice 137). The argument for self-defense or necessity would likely be
used by the Moroccan government. However, the acquisition of territory by force is neither
necessary nor justifiable in terms of self-defense. Many states have launched military campaigns
in foreign soil without establishing a continuous block of territory that is considered to be a part
of that state’s territory. The argument of necessity would also be brushed aside fairly easily,
considering that in order to protect their civilians from Sahrawi forces, Morocco could have
simply built a berm on their internationally recognized border and then launched a military
campaign in the south to prevent attacks on their territory.
Moreover, the Sahrawi POLISARIO forces and the SADR are not recognized by the
Moroccan government, meaning that the ICJ would disregard the argument of self-defense
because of their interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, as I previously
mentioned, Article 51 could be interpreted in such a way that does not allow for the argument of
self-defense to override the inherent right to self-determination that the Sahrawis have, as
asserted by the UN General Assembly (Rice-Oxley et al.). In regards to the argument that has –
rarely and wrongly – been used to defend the Israeli barrier that Israel is the administrative entity
over the West Bank and therefore has the power to construct the wall in the territory, Morocco is
not recognized as the sovereign nor the administrative power of Western Sahara (Copete 12).
However, because the berm does not create enclaves within territory that Morocco does
not occupy, the barrier does not obviously restrict access to other guaranteed rights. Though, it
could be interpreted as preventing Sahrawi access to rights because the majority of highly
populated cities and resources in the region are behind the Moroccan Berm (Damis 165; Brown
19). This could be interpreted as restricting other rights because cities have more healthcare-

Black 16
related and educational infrastructure than the sparsely populated region under POLISARIO
control.

Conclusion
By analyzing the rhetoric of both the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and some of its main
critiques, it is possible to develop a sort of illegality checklist. The conditions for illegality that
are outlined by the ICJ and have stood up as legitimate are that the barrier creates a forceful
acquisition of territory by a foreign entity, the barrier violates the populations’ inalienable right
to self-determination, or the barrier violates human rights like access to healthcare, education or
freedom of movement within one’s own territory. It is then logical to take these conditions that
applied to the barrier in and around the West Bank and apply them to other barriers across the
globe. Looking at the Moroccan berm, these conditions are met. The Moroccan berm especially
constitutes a forceful acquisition of territory, considering the construction of walls that move
farther and farther into territory that was considered the Sahrawis’, though it may not restrict the
Sahrawis’ access to other rights in the portion of Western Sahara that is not occupied by
Morocco.
As for the efficacy of the ICJ, it is logical to question its ability to bring about any real
legal change in the situations on which it delivers rulings or advisory opinions. In both cases
outlined above, the ICJ issued legal documents outlining the illegality of the situation and the
situation did not change. In the case of Israel, no change occured because of the veto power of
the UN Security Council. In this area, I would suggest research into the reasons behind both the
noncompulsory status of many of the ICJ’s actions and the veto power of the Security Council.
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Due to the high number of walls built and proposed, I highly recommend further research
into the conditions of these barriers. Namely, investigation into the American built walls in Iraqi
cities during the height of wall construction in order to ascertain the legality of the so-called
“surge” program (Niva 56). Additionally, I would recommend investigation into the application
of these conditions to other barriers that are along borers, namely those between Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, India and Bangladesh, and the United States and Mexico.
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